ISSUE PAPER SERIES

INVESTMENTS IN ADOLESCENT GIRLS' PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS

ISSUES AND REVIEW OF EVIDENCE

by

Agnes R. Quisumbing and Chiara Kovarik[1]

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1 The authors work for the International Food Policy Research Institute (www.ifpri.org)

INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO IMPROVING THE LIVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS
ISSUE PAPERS SERIES

This paper is one of a series of five Issue Papers commissioned by the Department for International Development, UK (DFID) and the Girl Hub, synthesizing key evidence on integrated approaches to economic assets, health, education, social norms and preventing violence, in improving the lives of adolescent girls. The focus on integrated approaches (addressing more than one area such as health **and** education) aimed to assess evidence testing the strength of integrated approaches, and to avoid duplicating recent sectoral based reviews.

Each Issue Paper is accompanied by a mapping of relevant research and evaluations of interventions. These mappings are available separately at the address below, where a compilation of mappings is also available.

The Issue Papers were commissioned to feed into a Technical Expert Meeting on Adolescent Girls, hosted by DFID and the Girl Hub on the 17th-18th October 2012 in London. The meeting drew together more than 60 leading experts working on adolescent girl research, programming, and evaluation to discuss priority research and evidence gaps and consider key methodological questions around research in this area.

This report represents solely the view point of the author, and does not necessarily represent the views or policy of Girl Hub, Nike Foundation, or DFID.

All the Issue Papers, the mappings, the compilation of mappings and the workshop report are available on http://www.girleffect.org.

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

For adolescent girls in the developing world, the ability to own and control assets can contribute to improved livelihoods and a pathway out of poverty. Assets can be both tangible and intangible, and individuals and households invest in assets to build their wealth and to increase their resilience to shocks. Different types of assets, from natural resource capital to political capital, can be particularly important for adolescent girls as a means through which they can invest in their own present and future well-being as they move through adolescence and into adulthood. This issues paper focuses on strengthening poor adolescent girls' ability to invest in and accumulate physical and financial assets. We define adolescent girls as girls between the ages of 10-19, while recognizing that adolescent girls are by no means a homogeneous group.

The paper gives a brief overview of the importance of economic assets to girls, as well as laying out the different ways girls can acquire, retain control of, and lose such assets. It then proceeds to document the variety of interventions that have occurred in this area, classifying the interventions into three categories: (1) those that are directed at origin families; (2) those that are directed at girls themselves; and (3) those that attempt to change rules, procedures, and laws underlying the ability of girls to acquire, accumulate, and retain control of assets. We also find that there are several programs directed at both girls and their families, and thus examine these as well. The paper focuses, in particular, on multi-sectoral/integrated investments, with the goal of highlighting existing and promising research and programming in this area, as well as identifying critical gaps and opportunities to move forward. We include studies that use both qualitative and quantitative methods of evaluation, in order to obtain the fullest picture of interventions that are taking place in this area.

The majority of the programs reviewed, and for which evaluations have been conducted, are targeted at adolescent girls themselves, with family members targeted to a lesser extent. Few programs have focused on changing rules and laws governing property rights institutions, and no evaluations exist as of yet that assess the impacts of these programs. The paper concludes by summarizing the extent of the evidence thus far, highlighting priorities for researchers and policymakers, and providing recommendations on the way forward.

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II. INTRODUCTION

Control over and ownership of assets is a critical component of well-being, for both adolescent girls and their families. Assets can be converted to cash, but they are also multi-dimensional. Assets both store wealth and can increase in value, although they can decrease in value as well. They can act as collateral and facilitate access to credit and financial services. Their flexibility can provide security through emergencies and opportunities in periods of growth (Deere and Doss 2006: 1). Programs to increase ownership of, and control over assets also help provide more permanent pathways out of poverty compared to programmatic measures that aim to increase incomes or consumption alone.[2] Beyond their economic effects, assets may also influence the current and future wellbeing of an individual or household in a variety of ways, such as improved future orientation and outlook on life (psychological effects); greater social empowerment – for example improved social status and feelings of social inclusion, and enhanced civic and political engagement (social effects); decreased risk-taking behaviors and improved awareness (health effects); and improved economic/social behaviors and wellbeing of offspring (intergenerational effects) (Schreiner and Sherraden 2007). Furthermore, assets that individuals control can also affect their bargaining power within their families; research has shown that assets brought to marriage by an adolescent girl may not only affect her own and her new family's long-term well-being, but could also determine the extent of power and influence she wields in her new family and community (Quisumbing, 2003).[3]

The term "assets" is often used very loosely in discussing resources that individuals and families control. The accounting definition of assets considers these as economic resources—"anything tangible or intangible that is capable of being owned or controlled to produce value and that is held to have positive economic value. Assets represent value of ownership that can be converted into cash (although cash itself is also considered an asset)".[4] The economics definition of assets typically treats them as stocks—forms in which wealth can be held (land, livestock, physical equipment) – while treating other resources such as public and private transfers, remittances, and savings, as flows either building up the asset, or being generated from it.

Individuals and households invest in different types of assets; not only tangible assets such as land, livestock, and machinery, but also intangible types. These different forms include:

- **Natural resource capital:** land, water, trees, and genetic resources;
- **Physical capital:** agricultural and business equipment, houses, consumer durables, vehicles and transportation, water supply and sanitation facilities, technology, and communications infrastructure;
- **Human capital:** education, skills, knowledge, health, nutritional status, and labor power;
- **Financial capital:** savings, credit, and accrued private and public transfers;[5]
- **Social capital:** membership in organizations, networks that increase trust, ability to work together, access to opportunities, reciprocity, and informal safety nets; and
- **Political capital:** citizenship, enfranchisement, and effective participation in governance—often key to controlling rights over other assets.

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2 This statement draws from the work of Michael Sherraden and colleagues. Sherraden (1991) argues that while income is important for consumption, it does not by itself enable people to improve their circumstances over the long term. Development occurs through asset accumulation and investment. Beverly et al. (2008), in an overview to a series on financial asset accumulation by low-income households, state that aside from education (an investment in human capital), US social policies have tended to focus on income transfers and social services that satisfy basic consumption needs, rather than measures to build the asset base of the poor. However, most income transfers are spent on consumption. An asset-based approach could complement this traditional approach and could shift the focus from short-term survival to the long-term development of individuals, families, and communities.

3 Evidence that assets brought to marriage influences spouses' bargaining power in marriage is documented by Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg (1997), Hallman (2000), Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka (2004), Fafchamps, Kebede, and Quisumbing (2009), among others; several other studies undertaken at the International Food Policy Research Institute are also found in Quisumbing, ed. (2003).

4 Sullivan, Arthur and Steven M. Sheffrin (2003). Economics: Principles in action. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458: Pearson Prentice Hall. pp. 272. ISBN 0-13-063085-3.

5 Following our distinction of stocks vs. flows, conditional cash transfers are not assets—they are flows—but accrued or accumulated transfers are a stock.

This issues paper focuses on strengthening poor adolescent girls' ability to invest in and accumulate physical (including land) and financial assets. We define adolescent girls as girls between the ages of 10-19. At the same time, we recognize that adolescent girls are not a homogeneous group, with important distinctions arising from differences in age, schooling/enrollment status, participation in formal, informal, and domestic work, marital status, whether or not the girl has children, and disability status. In particular, girls who have dropped out of school, young mothers, those who are HIV positive, those in conflict or post-conflict zones, and those who are disabled, may be among the most vulnerable and marginalized individuals within their respective societies. Important differences also arise from the family's initial wealth level and the social and cultural context of the girls' lives.[6] Our emphasis will be on poor girls in developing countries. Because developing countries have different social and cultural norms, particularly in regards to whether it is socially acceptable for girls or women to own and control assets, we attempt to capture this diversity as well. Most importantly, we also take into account gender norms: it is not enough to assess efforts to increase girls' assets; such efforts must be viewed in reference to how these attempts are able to decrease the gender asset gap.[7]

The paper begins by presenting a conceptual framework showing the relationship between the gendered distribution of assets, empowerment, and well-being. It then discusses why assets are important for adolescent girls, and then moves on to elucidating the ways through which girls acquire assets across the life course. It continues by reviewing the existing evidence on programs and interventions that have attempted to increase girls' physical and financial assets, emphasizing "bundled" interventions or integrated programs that combine efforts to build stocks of physical and financial assets with education, training, or programming to attain other development objectives, such as delayed marriage or prevention of risky sexual behavior. We end by summarizing "lessons learned," identifying new opportunities, and suggesting steps for future research and implementation.

Given that a very recent systematic review on assets-based interventions targeting adolescent girls already exists (Dickson and Bangpan 2012), we did not follow a systematic review protocol for this paper. Rather, we wanted to adopt a broader conceptual framework that looked at a wide range of actors and institutions potentially affecting investments in adolescent girls' assets—the girls themselves, their families, and social and legal institutions. We started by reading other reviews (including systematic reviews) that had previously been commissioned on this topic, as well as reviewing original research on adolescent girls and economic assets, followed by papers that cite these studies. We then conducted online searches (Google Scholar, peer-reviewed journals, etc.) using keywords, as well as publication searches of websites of organizations such as the World Bank, the Population Council, and the Nike Foundation that are known to work in this area.[8] We looked at both "bundled" interventions (those that look at economic assets in addition to another type of asset), and interventions that had a solely economic focus. We also included studies involving interventions using economic assets as an incentive to achieve another objective (such as delayed marriage), as well as those where building assets was the main objective. Finally, we conducted "snowball" citation techniques and sent emails to researchers at various institutions and in the field working on the topic of adolescent girls and/or economic interventions.

All in all we reviewed 41 programs, of which 38 were included in the matrix (the rest were excluded because they did not fall into the categories we used for classification, dealt solely with issues of education or health, or because the impact evaluation methodology did not include a counterfactual).[9] We did

6 For tables illustrating the heterogeneity of adolescent girls around the world, please see Tables 1-7 in Appendix 1: Quantitative Data on Adolescent Girls.

7 While programs may attempt to increase girls' (or women's) assets, if boys' (or men's) assets increase disproportionately more, this may not lead to net gains in girls' bargaining power within the household. Unfortunately, many program evaluations do not consider impacts on male assets—data is typically collected at the household level, or evaluations may focus on assets of the targeted individual (for example, women and girls) without looking at the distribution of assets within the household.

8 Keywords included, among others: adolescent girls AND adolescents AND youth; economic assets; financial assets AND financial literacy; youth savings AND youth savings accounts; and job skills training AND life skills training.

9 This count is based on the number of programs, not the number of studies, because some interventions generated multiple studies, and some interventions have not been evaluated or their evaluations are ongoing.

not confine ourselves to purely quantitative studies, because some of the more interesting insights emerged from qualitative studies and those using mixed qualitative and quantitative methods. In a few cases, we included studies where impact evaluations had not yet begun or were still ongoing because these were interesting projects that used an innovative approach to building girls' assets. The type of impact evaluation (or whether an evaluation was completed) is indicated in the accompanying matrix of interventions.

III. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK LINKING GENDER, ASSETS, AND WELL-BEING

Although there is a large and growing literature on empowerment (see Kabeer 1999; Alsop and Heinsohn 2005; Ibrahim and Alkire 2007), attention to assets in the gender literature has only emerged as a significant area of inquiry in the past few years (e.g., Deere and Doss 2006: Doss, Grown, and Deere 2008; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2011; Quisumbing, ed. 2003). As such, the link between assets and empowerment remains an area that is relatively unexplored. Research on gender and assets grew out of work on tests of models of household behavior that dismantled the idea of the unitary household, creating in its place a more nuanced understanding of how, within households, assets are not always pooled, but can be held individually by men, women, boys, and girls (Haddad et al. 1997). In many empirical tests of the collective vs. the unitary model of the household, assets featured prominently as a measure of the bargaining power of each spouse within marriage, whether these assets were measured at the time of marriage (Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg 1997; Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003), or at the time of the survey (Doss 1999). Generalizing beyond husband and wife, each household member may have access to different types or levels of assets and may have obtained them through different pathways, conditioned by social norms and beliefs, including those related to gender. Different types of assets may also have different implications for bargaining power or well-being within the household.



FIGURE 1 Schematic representation of the role of assets in a gendered livelihood conceptual framework. **Source: Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011)**

Researchers working on the Gender, Agriculture, and Assets Project at the International Food Policy Research Institute and the International Livestock Research Institute have developed a conceptual framework that highlights the gendered character of asset access, control, and ownership throughout a process of creation, accumulation, and savings or consumption (Meinzen-Dick et al, 2011). The conceptual framework above maps the gendered pathways through which asset accumulation occurs. Although this framework was initially developed to examine men's and women's asset ownership, it can also be used to examine asset accumulation by girls within their families and households. It includes not only men's and women's exclusively-owned assets but also assets whose control and ownership is jointly shared. Unlike previous frameworks, this model depicts the gendered dimensions of each component of the pathway, recognizing that men and women not only control, own, or dispose of assets in different ways, but also access, control, and own different kinds of assets. These assets are not only physical capital assets, but, as discussed in the introduction, also encompass natural capital, human capital, social capital, financial capital, and political capital. In this respect, this framework is very similar to the sustainable livelihoods framework (Carney et al. 1999; DFID

2001; Scoones 2009), in paying attention to assets, livelihoods, and the vulnerability context, but has been taken further by explicitly engendering the components of the framework.

This framework can be used to examine adolescent girls' asset accumulation because it was developed to show how gender and assets influence well-being of households and individuals. Many outcomes related to well-being that are of interest to policymakers and development donors are linked to the results of consumption (education, food security, nutrition, health); although these also have clear links to investment and asset accumulation, given that achieving these well-being outcomes requires the ability to maintain and build up assets over time and over the life cycle. Other aspects of well-being – such as self-esteem, one's status within the household and society, agency, and empowerment – are less easy to measure, but are also important, and are increasingly being considered as development goals in themselves. One would like to see, for example, interventions that aim to build girls' assets as not only expanding their incomes and consumption choices, but also empowering them—expanding their ability to make strategic life choices, particularly in contexts where this ability had been denied to them (Kabeer 2001). The conceptual framework helps identify pathways by which assets can have a positive impact on well-being. Adolescent girls' assets may: (1) directly impact well-being through the increased status and empowerment that asset ownership conveys; (2) enable girls to pursue various livelihood strategies; (3) provide a buffer against shocks; and (4) strengthen girls' positions in the broader community as well as within the household in terms of influencing how income is spent or invested.

IV. INVESTMENTS IN GIRLS OVER THE LIFE COURSE

The conceptual framework presented above can be used to examine asset accumulation by girls within their families and households, over the course of their lives. As girls grow older and transition through different life stages, the types of assets that are important for their well-being change, as do the ways in which they acquire these assets. Understanding this process of acquisition, accumulation, control over and use of assets is essential to understanding how targeted investments in girls over their life course can affect their well-being, both tangibly and intangibly, as well as that of their children.

WHY ARE PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS IMPORTANT FOR ADOLESCENT GIRLS?

In the introduction, we alluded to reasons why assets are important for adolescent girls' families: they serve as inputs into productive activities, stores of value, stocks of wealth that can grow over time, collateral that facilitates access to credit and financial markets, and a cushion in times of emergency. However, is it enough for adolescent girls to belong to families that own such assets? Or would ownership and control of physical and financial assets be important for girls themselves?

The ability to generate one's own income from assets is probably the first reason that comes to mind when considering the importance of owning assets. Ownership of a productive or income-generating asset, whether physical or financial, often (though not always) implies control of the income stream that asset generates. Moreover, bringing in income may increase the worth of the girl within her family, particularly if the household is resource-constrained. The bargaining power assets convey is yet another reason for their importance. Models of household decision making predict that one's bargaining power within the household is positively associated with asset ownership (for a review, see Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). While these models have typically been formulated in the context of spousal bargaining, variants of these models that examine bargaining between parents and children do point out the importance of assets as determinants of bargaining power. If a girl can bring these assets with her when she leaves her natal family—whether to marry or simply to establish her own household—and, more importantly, if she can remain in control of these assets, she brings with her a stock of wealth that can positively affect future income streams, her own well-being, and that of her children. Asset receipts, particularly those associated with a development program or intervention, may also have intangible benefits—they may raise girls' own aspirations about their lives, and they may increase parents' or society's implicit valuation of girls when they are perceived as economic actors.

The importance of physical and financial assets to girls' current and long-term well-being depends critically on where the girl is in her life course. For younger girls who are more dependent on their origin families (often, but not always, their natal families), investment in human capital is a priority. Various studies have shown that parental wealth is an important determinant of educational attainment; girls may not yet be actively accumulating physical or financial assets at this point, although they could start saving (or their parents may be saving for dowries or inheritance). In poorer families, however, girls may already be contributing to family livelihoods by working, providing childcare for younger siblings, or by doing chores, such as cleaning, cooking, and collecting water and firewood.[10] Depending on how paid or unpaid work fits into the school calendar, contributing to family livelihoods may compete with formal schooling, although the Young Lives study in Ethiopia (Tafere and Camfield 2009) finds that adolescent work is a fairly normal and expected occurrence and need not interfere with other activities. This finding, however, was seen to be less true for adolescents in poor and vulnerable households.

As girls grow older, especially those that come from poorer households, opportunity costs of schooling increase and they may leave school to work or to get married. Additionally, as economic pressures increase, girls may resort to selling their bodies in exchange for cash or gifts from men, especially older men. This

10 A baseline study for a Population Council and CARE India intervention (Sebastian, Grant, and Mensch 2005) found that adolescent boys were five times more likely to work for pay than adolescent girls. However, girls spent almost four times as many hours on household chores than boys.

puts these girls at an increased risk of sexual abuse, unsafe sex, unintended pregnancies, and STIs including HIV/AIDS. For these older girls, having physical or financial assets that they can control becomes more important not only in terms of providing them with current livelihoods but also of preventing risky behaviors. In terms of **direct** benefits of assets, they may provide a source of livelihoods (as in physical and productive assets). They could also form a foundation for future enterprises (as in financial assets). Girls therefore need to be trained to use and manage these assets wisely. In terms of **indirect** benefits, various programs have attempted to use assets as a vehicle for attaining other objectives, such as delaying marriage (Berhane Hewan in Ethiopia) or delaying or preventing the onset of risky sexual behavior (BRAC's ELA program in Uganda, and the TRY (Tap and Reposition Youth) program in Kenya). However, there is very little evidence that evaluates the impact of the various components in these bundled interventions (the exception being the ongoing evaluation of the Kishoree Kontha program, where individual components are randomly assigned), so we cannot be confident that these assets did indeed provide a vehicle for attaining these other objectives.

Finally, assets brought to marriage by adolescent girls have important impacts on their bargaining power in their new families and communities. Various studies have shown that the distribution of assets between spouses at the time of marriage is a possible determinant of bargaining power within marriage (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997). A six-country study of the assets that husbands and wives bring to marriage shows that, over time, in four out of six countries, age differences between husband and wife have decreased and in three out of six countries, husband–wife gaps in schooling attainment at marriage have also decreased (Quisumbing and Hallman 2005).[11] However, despite trends toward equality in age and education (which argues for an improvement in the balance of power within marriages), the distribution of land and physical assets at marriage continues to favor husbands. In three out of six countries, the husband–wife asset difference has not changed through time—and therefore continues to favor husbands. In the other three countries, this difference has increased. Persistent differences in physical assets in favor of men have important implications for household well-being and the welfare of future generations, especially given recent findings that show that increasing women's status and control of assets has favorable effects on a number of human capital outcomes, particularly in the next generation (Quisumbing, ed. 2003; Smith et al. 2003).

HOW DO GIRLS ACQUIRE ASSETS?

Girls acquire assets from their families of origin (whether nuclear or extended), as gifts, marriage-related transfers, or inheritance (either through inter-vivos transfers or upon the death of a parent), through their own agency (employment and savings), or through transfers from government or civil society institutions.[12] Typically, families of origin (both natal families and foster families, whether nuclear or extended) play a more important role for younger girls, with that importance declining as girls age and exercise more of their own agency. Origin families may also model saving or financial management behavior: the overwhelming majority of adolescents in Ghana and Kenya market research for the YouthSave project said that they learned to save by watching their parents, particularly their mothers, save (Deshpande 2012). Marital families may then take on a more important role after marriage in either limiting or encouraging further asset accumulation.

ORIGIN FAMILY INVESTMENTS IN GIRLS' ASSETS.

Aside from investing in human capital by providing resources for girls to go to school, origin families also invest in girls' assets in other ways. In many societies, notably in South Asia, families to whom a daughter is born immediately start saving for dowries. In these societies, as well as others, marriage is the occasion for the transfer of assets to children or to the families into which they are marrying—whether through dowries

11 Asset gaps between spouses at the time of marriage are not only a result of the age gap (husbands, who typically marry later, have had a longer duration over which to accumulate assets), but also because parents typically bestow more assets to sons than to daughters.

12 Girls may also acquire assets from boys or potential boyfriends, but these transfers may increase the probability of unsafe or risky sexual behavior.

or actual transfer of physical and other assets. In Ethiopia, for example, brides typically bring livestock to marriage as part of the gifts from their families. In other societies, girls also stand to inherit property from parents upon the latter's death, although typically at lower amounts than their brothers (except in notable cases of matrilineal inheritance, or in societies where egalitarian distribution is the norm).

GIRLS' INVESTMENTS IN THEIR OWN ASSETS

Girls may also invest in their own assets, particularly once they start working. Market research conducted for the YouthSave Program (Youth Save Consortium 2010) in 4 countries (Ghana, Kenya, Columbia, and Nepal) finds that it is common for children to start saving small amounts of money from at least age 12, though much of this saving occurs in informal ways. Some banks (such as Banco de Oro in the Philippines) even have programs that target children as young as age 7. To encourage savings, some governments have implemented matched savings programs, or child development accounts (CDAs), although these are not often targeted to girls.[13]

PUBLIC AND OTHER TRANSFERS THAT BUILD GIRLS' ASSETS

Public transfers or civil society programs may make transfers of assets themselves or of cash that can be mobilized to invest in assets.

MARITAL REGIMES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON GIRLS' ASSETS

Throughout the developing world, many girls marry at adolescence, although the age at marriage has been increasing over time. Although less well studied, the marital property rights regime and the family that a girl marries into may also influence her ability to continue accumulating assets. Deere and Doss (2006) point out that women's rights to property depend critically on marital (property) regimes. Marital regimes differ according to how property acquired prior to and during the marriage is treated, both while married and in case the relationship dissolves for whatever reason (separation, divorce, or death). In general, there are three main types of marital regimes: separation of property, partial community property, and full community property (Deere and León 2001).[14] Each of these three types is more common in different regions. For example, the partial community property regime is often practiced in Latin America, while the separation of property regime is found in some non-Hispanic Caribbean countries (e.g., Surinam) and in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. These property regimes are usually based on customary norms but are often legally recognized in most countries. Although marital property regimes may only appear relevant in the case of marital dissolution, this is a harsh reality for young wives and mothers—owing to HIV/AIDS and conflict, many young women may be widowed at a young age, and depending on the marital property regime, may not have secure rights to property.

LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGARDING ASSET OWNERSHIP

Laws governing the age at which one can open a bank account and hold the account in one's own name, sign contracts, and access inheritance and property rights may also affect girls' ability to retain control of assets that they may have invested in prior to marriage. Even if laws do allow girls to take control of these assets, social norms may limit their effectiveness. One of these laws could include the possibility, for example, for girls to inherit their parents' businesses, rather than have them revert to sons.[15]

13 There is a large literature on child savings programs in both developed and developing countries (also called child development accounts, or CDAs) which may involve matched savings from the government. See Loke and Sherraden, forthcoming.

14 In the context of marital regimes, community property refers to the joint property of husband and wife, not that of the community where they live or to which they belong. Under separation of property, both spouses retain individual ownership of the assets they acquire both before and during marriage. If the marriage dissolves, each spouse is automatically entitled only to their own property, since there is no community property to divide. Under full community property, all property acquired before and during marriage is considered the joint property of the couple; if the marriage dissolves, all assets are divided equally between the two spouses. Partial community property combines features of both of these regimes. Property acquired prior to marriage remains the individual property of each spouse both during the marriage and after marital dissolution; however, all assets acquired during marriage (with the major exception of inheritances) are considered joint community property and divided into equal shares should the marriage dissolve. See Deere and León (2001).

15 Inheriting a parent's business does not only involve inheriting business assets, but also business connections—a very important form of social capital that is very difficult to value in monetary terms.

HOW DO GIRLS RETAIN OR LOSE CONTROL OF ASSETS?

The same processes that contribute to girls' accumulation of assets may also lead to the loss of those assets. Unlike human capital, which is embodied in individuals, physical and financial assets can be taken or given away, sometimes involuntarily. And while girls may retain nominal ownership of assets, control is often ceded to parents, husbands, or other male relatives—highlighting that ownership and control of assets are different, though related, concepts.

In many cultures, marriage is an occasion for major transfers of physical assets to young men and women. However, there is no guarantee that girls retain control of assets that they bring to marriage, even if the assets may improve her bargaining power within her new family. In Bangladesh, girls who marry out of their villages may give up land inheritance rights to their brothers in return for the latter's support. There is also ample evidence that dowries in South Asia pass into control of the girl's marital family. In Ethiopia, control of assets typically ends up in the hands of the head of the household (regardless of sex and regardless of who brought the asset to marriage) (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002). Moreover, the distribution of assets upon death or divorce often depends upon whether the wife has had children; if she is childless, she is less likely to inherit. While in some cultures women can take assets brought to marriage with them upon marital dissolution (examples are the Philippines and Indonesia, as discussed in Quisumbing 1994 and Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg 1997, respectively), this is very much determined by the marital regime governing the marriage (see discussion above). In Sub-Saharan Africa, widows—who could also be adolescent girls—are often disadvantaged in terms of inheritance (Peterman 2012). There are many documented instances in which families of the deceased husband take over the inheritance, dispossessing the wife and her children.

V. POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS TO ENABLE INVESTMENT IN ADOLESCENT GIRLS' PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS

The accompanying matrix summarizes interventions and policies that enable girls and their families to invest in physical and financial assets. This section (and the matrix) classifies interventions and policies into three categories, depending on the target of the intervention.

Category 1 programs are those that are directed at origin families (whether natal or extended family) to encourage them to invest in girls, broadly speaking. These programs may be motivated by slightly different objectives. Some programs recognize that poverty is the root cause of underinvestment in children, particularly girls, and aim to overcome this constraint by providing transfers to the family in general. These include programs that give cash or other resources to families, often designating the mother or an adult female as recipient, based on the evidence that transfers to adult women disproportionately benefit girls—the family (or family member) is the direct beneficiary, and the girl the indirect beneficiary. Other programs target these resources through families specifically so that girls may increase their assets.[16] The family (or someone in the family) is the recipient, but the girl is the direct beneficiary. These investments can include physical and financial incentives to keep girls in school (including programs to delay marriage that are targeted to families), or asset transfers to the families conditional on their making provisions for the girls to become owners of the assets.

Category 2 programs are directed to girls themselves, whether the main objective is to build up their physical and financial assets, or whether these assets are used as incentives to achieve another objective (for example, delayed marriage or reduced risky sexual behavior). In this type of program, the girl is both the recipient and the direct beneficiary, depending on whether she can maintain control of the transfer.

Most programs that we reviewed fall into Category 2, although there is also a mix of Category 1 and/or 2 programs, depending on the age of the girl and whether both girls and their families are targeted.

Category 3 programs/policies attempt to change rules, procedures, and laws underlying the ability of girls to acquire, accumulate, and retain control of assets. These include relatively simple changes in rules, such as those that allow girls to own assets at younger ages, or improvements in civil registration to facilitate the issuance of IDs, to possibly more controversial reforms, such as those in inheritance law (affecting origin family transfers to girls) and marriage law (affecting the degree to which girls can retain control of assets within marriage and upon divorce). As of now, there are very few programs that address this issue—which might be an unexplored opportunity for policy influence.[17]

All three types of programs have a mix of objectives: in some of them, asset transfers or financial incentives are used to achieve another outcome; in others, the primary objective is to build the asset base of girls. Programs may also have a mixture of objectives; we have indicated this in the accompanying matrix of interventions.

PROGRAMS DIRECTED AT ORIGIN FAMILIES

Programs directed at origin families use financial or asset transfers to encourage the families to continue investing in girls. These transfers typically envision younger girls as beneficiaries, most often those who are

16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insightful categorization of different types of transfer programs.

17 Because this area is so new, efforts to enact new reforms must proceed with caution, so as not to counteract the effect of other reforms. For example, marriage laws regarding the age of girls might inadvertently impact their ability to benefit from laws regarding ability to control assets in marriage. A girl married at age 14 might not be able to make use of the latter law if she is not supposed to be married—unless laws regarding control are interpreted to apply to all marriages, regardless of the age at which they were contracted.

unmarried and still under the care of their parents, even if the actual recipient of the transfer is another family member. These include unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programs (such as pensions and child grants, where the recipient could be the grandparent or the mother) as well as conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs. In these programs, financial incentives are used to achieve other objectives—investing in human capital or delayed marriage.

Many conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs fall into this category. For example, both Bangladesh and Pakistan have implemented secondary school stipend programs designed to **encourage girls' enrollment and to keep girls in school**. In Bangladesh, the female secondary school stipend program included a fixed stipend and tuition subsidy program for girls in rural areas who attended 75 percent of school days, attained a certain level of measured academic proficiency, and remained unmarried. Tuition was paid directly to schools and was expected to cover up to 50 percent of all school costs, while the stipend, which was paid directly to an account in the girl's name in a state agricultural bank, covered 50 percent of the costs of textbooks, uniforms, stationary, transportation, exam fees, and miscellaneous direct educational expenses. Some of the stipend programs were complemented by other reforms and development, depending on the donor, but the stipend itself accounted for two-thirds of the total outlay for the program. An evaluation (Khandker et al. 2003) found that the program increased girls' secondary education substantially but had no effect on or even decreased boys' enrollment in co-educational schools, a finding that was corroborated by later work (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009). It also found that the untargeted stipend disproportionately affected the school enrollment of girls from households with larger land wealth.

In a similar CCT program in Punjab, Pakistan, eligible girls receive a stipend of Rs. 200/month conditional on their being enrolled in grades 6-8 in a government girls' school in a target district, and conditional on their maintaining average class attendance of at least 80 percent a month (Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010). An impact evaluation found that the program increased female enrolment by 9 percent between 2003 and 2005 (in terms of relative changes) and resulted in an additional six female students per school (in terms of absolute change).

In Cambodia, the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) scholarship program gave each girl a $45 "scholarship" each year for 3 years. Families received these cash transfers provided their daughter was enrolled in school, maintained a passing grade, and was not absent without "good reason" more than 10 days in a year. According to an evaluation by Filmer and Schady (2006), the program increased enrollment and attendance of recipients at program schools by 30 percentage points, with larger impacts seen among girls with the lowest socioeconomic status at baseline.

Some programs also use cash transfers and financial incentives to **delay age at marriage**. These programs are still at an early stage so there are few impact evaluation results. One of the earlier programs, the Apni Beti Apna Dhan (Our Daughter Our Wealth) program, has been implemented in Haryana State, India, from 1994 up to the present. In this program, mothers receive a cash amount of 500 Rs upon the birth of a daughter. Within 3 months of a girl's birth, Rs 2500 is invested in a Federal Government Savings Bond Scheme. This amount doubles in 5 years and is reinvested every 5th year. Girls can withdraw the maturity amount of 25000 when they are 18 provided that they are unmarried. Girls also receive a bonus for completing grade 5 and grade 8. Since program participation data was not available to the researchers, Sinha and Yoong (2009) conducted a study using statewide household survey data collected before and after the implementation of the reform to construct proxies for program enrollment based on household composition at the time the program was implemented. These findings show that parents are more likely to invest in their daughters' human capital as a result of the program. There are greater investments made in post-natal health for girls and while the girls are not significantly more likely to attend school, if they are already enrolled they may be more likely to continue their education. The International

Center for Research on Women is currently evaluating this program, interviewing girls who will now have reached age 18, to investigate the long-term impact of the program on marriage age and on the use of the accumulated funds.[18]

Another program, the Finote Hiwot program in East and West Gojam, Ethiopia, is considering the provision of a stipend of 420 Birr per quarter to all households with girls ages 9-15 (for at most two girls per household) for up to three years (Calder and Goodman 2012). The transfer would be made to the primary female adult caregiver, if possible, and if not, to the primary male caregiver. The program would test whether encouraging girls to enroll in, attend, and complete school through the provision of economic support or increasing girls' status in the household through the direct transfer of economic resources to the household is better at delaying marriage age.

An innovative program that involves actual asset transfers to origin families is being implemented by Landesa (Rural Development Institute) in India (Middey and Fletschner 2010). The "Security of Girls through Land" project builds on an existing project (the West Bengal Cultivation and Dwelling Plot Allocation (CDPA) project) that allocates small plots of land to landless households. The intervention works at the family level, but has implications for girls' future assets. First, with respect to the origin families, plots allocated to dual-headed households are titled jointly in the names of the husband and wife, and female-headed households and daughter-only households are given priority. Moreover, all sons and daughters are listed as co-inheritors in the land title—an innovation for rural India, where girls are disadvantaged in terms of land ownership. The project is also working with the Department of Women and Child Development to create girls and boys groups that incorporate a land rights curriculum, and to hold community conversations that include men and women, to discuss issues impacting girls' inheritance rights. This illustrates the point that communities, not only individuals or their families, need to be targeted for interventions, particularly if the intervention involves changing attitudes and, eventually, social norms. Similar to the programs aimed at delaying marriage, this is a relatively new initiative, and an impact evaluation study has just begun. This program is unusual among the programs in this category in that it aims to build the asset base of girls, or change the "rules" by which girls can acquire assets.

The pro-girl emphasis of the two India programs—Apni Beti and Landesa—is worth noting. It is possible that this emphasis was intended by program designers to counteract sex-selective abortions and son preference. These programs are still so new that no studies have been done examining whether they increase incentives to have children in general. Typically, programs try to dampen natalist incentives by putting a cap on the number of children per family who are eligible for benefits.

PROGRAMS DIRECTED TO GIRLS THEMSELVES

Most of the programs reviewed fall into this category—programs directed to girls themselves. Roughly half of the girl-targeted programs (10 out of 24 reviewed), particularly those that involve "bundled" interventions, use economic and financial assets as instruments for achieving other objectives (reducing risky sexual behavior, achieving physical and mental health, increasing age at marriage), with building and/or managing physical and financial assets as a dual objective. The other half of the programs (11 out of 24 reviewed) in this category focus primarily on building financial assets, with the other objectives being secondary.

Bundled interventions using physical/financial assets as instruments to achieve other goals. Many programs use financial incentives to achieve other objectives. For example, quite a number of programs use financial incentives to reduce risky sexual behavior. An intervention directed to AIDS-orphaned adolescents in Uganda involved an economic security/empowerment intervention consisting of: twelve 1-2 hour workshops over a 10-month period that focused on asset building and financial planning; a monthly mentorship program with mentors on future planning; and a child savings account dedicated

18 We thank Priya Nanda of ICRW for bringing this to our attention. The results of this study are not yet available.

to paying for secondary school or a small family business (all participants chose education as their saving goal) (Ssewamala, Han and Neilands 2009). 268 adolescents were randomly assigned to receive an economic empowerment intervention or the usual care for orphaned children. In the intervention group, the child savings account was a matched savings account, with a match rate of 2:1 and match cap of roughly $10/month. Children in the treatment group saved on average $76/year, which came out to $228/year when matched, and there were no statistically significant differences in savings by gender.

One hypothesis was that children given the opportunity to accumulate assets through the intervention would be less likely to engage in risky sexual behaviors. The RCT-based evaluation, which involved a 90-minute individual interview at baseline and another at the 10-month follow up, found that the program reduced youth's self-reported sexual risk-taking intentions. However, because the intervention was bundled, it is not possible to determine which aspect, if any, of the intervention is most responsible for this change. The findings also suggest that impacts may vary by sex and age: boys exhibited higher intentions to engage in unsafe sexual behavior, and older adolescents were more likely to report higher intentions to engage in sexual risk-taking behaviors (Ssewamala et al 2010a). Another study based on the same intervention investigated the role of "complementary capitals" (social capital) on human capital (schooling) and financial capital (Ssewamala et al 2010b). The study hypothesized that orphaned adolescents with higher levels of social capital will report better educational outcomes than those of orphaned adolescents with lower levels of social capital, and that amongst program enrollees, participants with higher levels of social capital will report higher savings than participants with lower levels of social capital. Findings show that if given the opportunity, poor families in Uganda will use financial institutions to save for the education of their adolescent youth, with girls reporting more positive future educational plans than boys. Two measures of social capital (knowing that parents were saving for the child and involvement in a formal youth group) were associated with slightly better educational outcomes. Lastly, support from an adult is strongly associated with higher saving performance among adolescents. Another study based on the same intervention also found that the economic empowerment intervention (i.e. – asset ownership) resulted in significant positive effects on adolescents' self-rated health and mental health functioning (Ssewamala, Han and Neilands 2009).

Another program that uses financial training to achieve other objectives is BRAC's Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescent Girls (ELA) Programme in Uganda (Bandiera et al 2012). The program, which focused on livelihood and financial training plus sexual health, sought to achieve socio-economic empowerment of adolescent girls by combining a safe social space with livelihood and life-skills training and community participation. The program established Adolescent Development Clubs to provide safe spaces for the girls, provided life skills training to build knowledge and reduce risky behaviors, livelihood skills training to enable adolescent girls to start small-scale income generating activities, and conducted community and parent forums.[19] Since the intervention is not school based, it can reach girls who have dropped out of school. Results from the RCT-based impact evaluation showed that the program significantly improved HIV and pregnancy related knowledge; treatment adolescents are almost 29 percent less likely to report being a mother, and among those that are sexually active, routine condom usage increased by almost 50 percent. The intervention also raised the likelihood of girls being engaged in income generation by 35 percent. This was one of the few programs we came across that included information on the cost of the program, which, for this program, was $28.10 per girl in the first year, and $17.90 in the second year. By looking at the value of the additional consumption the girls have in the second year, the second year cost of the program is 21 percent of these expenditures – a figure that does not include a valuation of the decrease in pregnancy, or increase in empowerment (Goldstein 2012). Even if these are nonmonetary benefits that are difficult to value, these are important improvements in girls' wellbeing.

Financial assets and livelihood training were also a key entry point in the TRY (Tap and Reposition Youth) Program in Nairobi, Kenya. The overall aim of the program was to reduce adolescents' vulnerability to adverse social and reproductive health outcomes by improving their livelihoods options. It used a modified

19 At the time of the evaluation, the program did not provide financial services through microfinance, but this is a current feature of the program.

group-based micro-finance model to extend integrated savings, credit, business support and mentoring on livelihoods, and reproductive health education to out-of-school adolescents and young women (aged 16-22) in low income and slum areas of Nairobi. Participants in the program were required to save about US $0.65 each week, and loans available to those seeking to avail of them started at about US $130. At end-line, girls who had participated in TRY had significantly higher income levels, household assets, and savings than control girls (Eruklar and Chong 2005). Participants also demonstrated a higher likelihood of keeping savings in a safe place, having a more liberal attitude towards gender, and a small likelihood of having a greater ability to refuse sex and insist on condom use.

However, the program experienced very high dropout rates – by endline, 66 percent of participants had dropped out. The authors attribute this high dropout rate to two major reasons: increasing suspicion among participants that they would be unable to access their savings, and the failure to replace a reassigned credit officer, which led to delays in receiving loans and accessing savings. The program was more successful for older girls (above age 20); younger girls (below age 20) were significantly more likely to drop out.

Another program, Kishoree Kontha in southern Bangladesh, has implemented a program of four interventions in 307 of 460 target villages. The four packages are: (1) a Basic Package comprised of literacy and numeracy training for illiterate girls, as well as social competency training; (2) a Livelihoods Package, which includes the Basic Package in addition to sessions on financial livelihood readiness; (3) a Full Package, which includes the Livelihoods Package in addition to a financial incentive meant to delay marriage until age 18 (the provision of 16 liters of cooking oil each year to girls aged 15-17) and (4) the Delayed Marriage Package, which includes only the cooking oil incentive. While the results of this intervention are forthcoming, the design of the project, which randomizes each component separately, should allow researchers to identify whether the project's effects are due to direct financial incentives or changes in mindset (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab 2012).

Other programs acknowledge the role that peer groups can play in interventions. The Safe and Smart Savings Products for Vulnerable Adolescent Girls program in Kenya and Uganda has a platform centered around three critical components: (1) a physical safe space where girls in a community can gather; (2) a group of girls of the same age; and (3) a young female mentor from the community. Despite the group-focused nature of the program, each girl has an individual savings account and undergoes financial education (Austrian and Ngurukie 2009). Evaluation results have not yet been released; although a pilot study was to have been completed by the end of 2009, with next steps rolled out in 2010.

Another program, Aflatoun, bundles social and financial education together, with the goal of educating children on their rights and providing children with practical experience. They currently operate in 89 countries around the world. In each country, the program is slightly different, working in partnership with local NGOs, and offering different programs to various target age groups. As of October 2012, 1.3 million children had been reached, and, as of the end of 2010, 44 percent of children were actively saving, with an average monthly saving amount of 0.11 Euro. Findings from evaluations in various program countries show positive results: in Nigeria (2009), there was a 12 percent increase in the number of children who had a safe place to save at the end of the year, while results from Ethiopia (2011) found that 62 percent of children plan to use their savings for education. Aflatoun is currently working with Mercy Corps in Tajikistan to conduct a randomized control trial looking at whether its Aflateen program has had any impacts on reproductive health for young women. The size and scale of the Aflatoun program allows for interesting cross-country and cross-program comparisons (Aflatoun 2012).

Another noteworthy program is the Siyakha Nentsha program in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, because it involved both adolescent boys and girls. Boys were explicitly included in the program so that boys and girls could learn to work together, interact socially, and learn to respect one another, allowing for outcomes to be measured for both sexes in a setting with comfortable gender relations. The program works through schools, particularly with students in grades 10 and 11, delivering two to three one-hour classroom-based sessions per week. Two different versions of the program were tested: the basic version (which focused on social and health capabilities) and the enhanced version (which also included financial capabilities); these versions were compared against a "control group" that received the standardized version of life skills training delivered across South Africa. A comparison between baseline surveys and a follow-up survey 18 months later found that both the basic and enhanced versions of the program resulted in increased knowledge among both boys and girls on where to obtain condoms and how to budget and plan. Participants were also more likely to have attempted to open a bank account. Girls in the program reported enhanced self-esteem and, in the enhanced package, a greater likelihood of having a birth certificate, while boys were more likely to report abstinence, fewer sexual partners, or a greater likelihood of having a South African ID (Hallman and Roca 2011).

Despite the promising results from the projects mentioned above, success is not universal. In a livelihoods intervention implemented by CARE India and the Population Council in the urban slums of Allahabad, only 10 percent of the 1,017 participants were able to earn income with the new skills they were taught in the intervention, which included counseling on livelihoods, vocational skills, and savings formation. Reasons cited by the participants for the failure to translate their new skills into work include the inability to assert themselves enough to ask for paid work, or a difficulty in finding work. The authors note that the intervention, which lasted only 19 months, and involved a very limited amount of actual contact hours with the girls, may not have been long enough to change entrenched gender attitudes in the area (Sebastian, Grant and Mensch 2005). In SHAZ!, a program targeting out-of-school girls in Zimbabwe, the initial hope that economic empowerment would lead to reproductive empowerment fell short. Although many participants did show improved knowledge around risky sexual behaviors, the economic intervention was found to be too far removed from the realities of the young women's lives. However, it is worth noting that the baseline research for the SHAZ! pilot included interviews with only 49 girls, so the results may not be indicative of the adolescent girl population as a whole. In the well-documented TRY program in Kenya, younger girls had a higher dropout rate. The authors note that "this finding has implications for the appropriateness of the model, particularly the credit component of the model, for younger, less educated adolescents who are perhaps more vulnerable" (Erulkar and Chong 2005).

FINANCIAL ASSET-FOCUSED INTERVENTIONS

Although there is a large literature evaluating the impact of microfinance programs, particularly those targeted to women, there are relatively few evaluations of programs that are specifically targeted to adolescents. However, many of the lessons learned from the more general reviews are relevant here. Quisumbing and Pandolfelli (2010) argue that the literature on the gendered impact of financial services often overemphasizes credit at the expense of other aspects of financial services for poor women, and underemphasizes opportunities to save—and to protect those savings. Finding the appropriate savings vehicle could be an important innovation in financial services markets. Quisumbing and Pandolfelli (2010) also point out the need to have financial services products that are tailored to the different needs of a heterogeneous clientele.

In that regard, a study by Kalyanwala and Sebstad (2006) on the savings and borrowing behavior of girls in Gujarat, India, is instructive. They find that girls are more likely than boys to save, but less likely to save in a bank. Although many earn wages, these tend to be small amounts and are quite variable. Most money that girls have on hand comes from gifts or pocket money from their family. Very few girls control this money themselves; they often turn over their money to their parents, either out of a sense of obligation or because parents ask for it. While this may be beneficial to girls in that it increase their status within the family, it opens up an ambiguous area about girls' agency regarding their own savings. Girls in the intervention feel that they need permission from parents, husbands, or family members to spend their own money, and cultural restrictions on women's mobility limit their ability to make purchases. Few participated in decisions on how money would be used, and those who did participate in decision-making were generally urban, older, better educated, or holders of their own accounts. Encouraging girls to save in their own names and in bank accounts that they can control would be an important first step in helping them build their base of financial assets.

Some innovative programs have used different means to encourage youth in general and adolescent girls in particular to save and/or develop financial management skills and entrepreneurship. These programs often involve "youth savings accounts" (YSAs) although the savings accounts themselves may only be one component of the program. YSAs are savings accounts that are targeted specifically to youth or designed to be easily accessible to youth (Deshpande 2012), and are gaining interest within the development community due to research suggesting they may contribute to development outcomes, as well as among financial institutions as a way to expand their products and their customer base (Deshpande and Zimmerman 2010). Many of these follow a group-based model, similar to the early stages of microfinance, and have varying levels of parent/guardian engagement. For example, the Advancing Integrated Microfinance (AIM) for Youth program in Mali and Ecuador provides a combination of group financial services and financial education for 37,000 low-income youth aged 13-24 (22,000 in Mali and 15,000 in Ecuador). In both countries, parents are engaged in both the financial education session and the promotional activities, in order to ensure their support (Freedom from Hunger 2011).

The Aspire program in Mongolia developed a formal savings account for low-income girls, in addition to having them undergo a financial education program module; however, girls do not have to have an account to undergo financial training. The program targets low-income girls, whether or not they are in school, between ages 14-17. Incentives are provided for opening accounts, for reaching various deposit levels, and for regular deposit behavior, and no parental permission is needed to participate (Microfinance Opportunities 2011).

Similarly, Ishaka (meaning "courage for the future") is a program operating in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas of two provinces in Burundi that aims to empower 20,000 girls (ages 14-22) through a combination of village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) and support services. The program provides training on savings group management, financial education, sexual and reproductive health, and human rights, and is publicized through theater, radio and a financial education comic book series (Microfinance Opportunities 2011). An analysis of the program found that the project was successful in increasing girls' agency (including increased control over income and assets) and social capital (including a substantial increase in freedom of movement and a small reduction in violence and forced sexual intercourse). However, the intervention did not perform as well when it came to norm changes around girls' access to MFIs or their actual access to these institutions (PriAct 2012).

A Catholic Relief Services and Caritas Rwanda program that aims to develop girl entrepreneurship is the Savings and Internal Lending Communities program in Rwanda. It is targeted to adolescents between 12-18 years of age, and has 27, 000 members, of which 6,200 are orphans and vulnerable children. Child-headed households are also targeted. Groups are composed of 25 individuals, all of whom are self-selected, and are often composed of both youth and adults, to allow for mentoring and transfer of life skills. The program provides basic financial education along with vocational training. Program documents indicate that over 90 percent of orphans and vulnerable children who are participants in the program have been able to pay into the national healthcare scheme, which is mandatory (YouthSave Consortium 2010). It is unclear, however, whether a rigorous impact evaluation methodology was used, and there is no mention of what percentage might have paid into the healthcare scheme without the program. Aside from program documents that were made available to us, it is unclear whether these programs have been rigorously evaluated, so apart from knowing how many girls participated, we do not know the real impact of the program on savings behavior.

One caveat about the modification of the group-based microfinance model in encouraging girls to save is the issue of where those savings come from in the first place—particularly in programs that require matching. If girls obtain funds for matching savings contributions from males (whether peers or older men), they could potentially be at risk for unsafe sexual behavior if these funds come with "conditionalities." None of these savings projects have the possibility—at present—of borrowing against future earnings, as would be the case in student loan programs in developed countries. If girls were able to borrow against future earnings, they could potentially be able to raise sufficient capital to purchase large physical assets or to start a business.

Several countries have taken the youth savings account concept even further and have recently implemented or are proposing policies that build assets for every child starting from birth. Among the countries that already have some form of national child development account (CDA) policy are Singapore, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Canada. Loke and Sherraden (forthcoming) propose that CDAs should be designed around the core principles of inclusiveness (universal access for eligible citizens, particularly those from lower income brackets), progressivity (equal monetary benefits regardless of income), coherence and integration (uniting asset-building initiatives into one that can be followed throughout the child's life-course), and development (enhancing opportunities and capabilities of people, empowering individuals and families to be in control of their lives, and enabling greater contribution to society and the economy). While the existing literature has not focused on targeting these to girls, if the principle of inclusiveness is followed, girls should be equally eligible to have a CDA in their own name. Unfortunately, this concept may still be beyond the reach of poorer countries—and thus projects promoting youth savings may be the only option available to families of girls in poorer countries.

EMPLOYMENT-CREATION INTERVENTIONS

A final group of programs that falls into this category is those programs that encourage youth employment. Innovative programs such as the Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women (EPAG) program, which was launched in Liberia in 2009 as a part of the World Bank's Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI), seeks to increase employment and earning among young women. This program, led by the Liberian Ministry of Gender and Development (MoGD) consists of six months of classroom training followed by six months of mentoring and support, meant to create a seamless transition to self or wage employment. Thirty percent of the girls enrolled in the program were trained in job skills targeted to high-demand sectors (hospitality, office/computer skills, professional cleaning, etc.) while seventy percent of girls were trained in business development skills (entrepreneurship, money management, record-keeping, etc.). Findings from the midline survey show that for young women enrolled in the program, employment rose 50 percent from baseline levels. Average weekly incomes also increased by an impressive 115 percent, and average savings increased as well (World Bank, forthcoming).

A preliminary evaluation of the EPAG program is one of the few evaluations we came across that takes into account cost-effectiveness of the program. Findings from the midline survey indicate that despite high upfront costs per girl ($1221 and $1678 for the business skills training and job skills training, respectively), participants will be able to increase their future earnings in an amount equal to the original investment. However, it is estimated that for business skills participants this will take two years, while for job skills participants it could take up to eight years. Based on these findings, EPAG is changing its program design, allowing a greater percentage of participants (now 82 percent instead of 70 percent) to learn business skills (World Bank 2012).

Another intervention focused on employment generation demonstrates promising results not only on likelihood of being employed, but also on earnings and likelihood of owning tangible assets that can contribute to income generation. A vocational education program jointly administered by two non-governmental organizations in the slums of New Delhi, India, offered a subsidized vocational education program in stitching and tailoring to women. Findings from a follow-up survey administered 6 months after the baseline survey find that women randomly offered the program are not only five percentage points more likely to be employed, but also earn twice as much in the post-training period as women who were not offered the training, and are 15 percentage points more likely to own a sewing machine (Maitra and Mani 2012). While this program was offered to women ages 18-39, and thus not strictly targeted towards adolescent girls, it is possible that its findings can be extrapolated to younger adolescents.

A recent study by Elizabeth Katz explores the positive impacts of adolescent girls' employment, citing a body of evidence that shows the benefits of interventions – from job vouchers, to skills training, small grants, and microfinance programs – all of which seek to strengthen girls' abilities to engage in work. She also examines current trends in female youth employment in the developing world and finds that unemployment among young women has been greatly affected by the economic crisis. She quotes ILO statistics from 2012 showing that unemployment among young women in North Africa has risen by close to 30 percent since 2008, while in South Asia it has risen by close to 14 percent (Katz, forthcoming). These trends hold large implications for the livelihoods and well-being of girls and young women.

PROGRAMS DIRECTED TO GIRLS AND THEIR FAMILIES

There are also a number of programs that take advantage of the opportunity to work simultaneously with girls and their families. Among these, the most innovative are the Berhane Hewan program in Ethiopia (Erulkar and Muthengi 2007), the Zomba Cash Transfer Program in Malawi (Baird et al 2009), Mia in the Dominican Republic (Microfinance Opportunities 2011), and Empowering Adolescent Girls in Ethiopia (Catholic Relief Services and the Nike Foundation 2009). Similar to the programs discussed above, some of these programs use assets or economic incentives to achieve other objectives such as delayed marriage age, while others focus on building assets as a primary objective.

In the first type of program, the Berhane Hewan program in the Amhara Region of Ethiopia gave a goat to each girl who remained unmarried for the duration of their involvement in the project. Groups of adolescent girls aged 10-19 were mobilized into groups led by female mentors. Support was given for girls to stay in school or to convene groups outside school, discussing topics such as education and livelihood skills training. "Community conversations" were also held to engage the community at large in discussion on key issues—another example of the community being an integral part of the intervention. An evaluation of the program (Erulkar and Muthengi 2007) found that girls in the program were three times more likely to be in school compared to controls, with impacts particularly apparent for younger adolescents (10-14). Younger girls (10-14) were 90 percent less likely to be married than control girls of the same age. Girls in the program were also more knowledgeable on HIV, STDs, and family planning, and were three times more likely to have used any method of family planning. However, the evaluation shows that girls in the older age group (15-19) were more likely to be married by the end of the program. This raises the issue of the appropriate age to target for interventions. The demonstrated impact may simply arise because families hold off marrying their girls up to the age where they could still qualify for program benefits. On the other hand, demographers have argued that delaying marriage age by just a few years has significant impacts on a girl's life prospects and the demographic burden, in general (Hervish and Feldman-Jacobs 2011). In terms of the girls' own physical readiness for childbearing and child rearing, just two years can make a big difference during the adolescent growth period.

A similar pilot program focusing on never married girls who were ages 13-22 at baseline, the Zomba Cash Transfer Program in Malawi, consists of a conditional arm and an unconditional arm that provides school fees and direct cash transfers to young women and their households who stay in or return to school. In the conditional arm, households received transfers if the girl had attended school 75 percent of days in the last month. The average transfer to households was $10/month over the course of 10 months, split between the student's guardian and schoolgirl herself (on average the schoolgirl received 30 percent of the transfer). Baird et al (2009) examined the one-year impact of a then ongoing two-year randomized evaluation, in which girls were randomly assigned to conditional and unconditional arms. The program led to large increases in enrollments, especially for those not enrolled at baseline, as well as reduced drop-out rates for those already in school. The marriage rate dropped by over 40 percent among those not in school at baseline, but no effect was observed for those already in school. The program reduced the likelihood of becoming pregnant by more than 30 percent among those not in school at baseline, but did not affect those already in school. Finally, program beneficiaries reduced their sexual activity both by delaying sexual activity and reducing their number of partners. Interestingly, these effects on marriage, pregnancy, and sexual activity were found only in the unconditional group, and not in the conditional group, which raises the issue of the necessity of using conditions for cash transfer programs, particularly if meeting the conditions is difficult for families (Baird et al. 2009).

A program that sought to build girls' own financial assets is Mia ("Mine"), implemented in the Dominican Republic. Targeted to two groups of girls (aged 10-15 and 16-24), the program aimed to create financial capabilities among adolescent girls. A passbook savings account was complemented by school-based financial education programs (both public and private schools), and incentives were provided based on the number of deposits. Girls were given free gifts and parents were invited to information sessions. As of June 2010, 2,936 savings accounts had been opened, there were 2,500 participants in the classroom financial education training, and 600 branch-based awareness-raising sessions had been held (Microfinance Opportunities 2011).

Finally, the Empowering Adolescent Girls (EAG) program in Ethiopia was a multi-sectoral intervention with multiple objectives. Implemented between June 2006 and August 2009, the program worked with 5,500 in and out-of-school girls ages 10-19. The sectors covered by the program included: (1) Leadership, Voice and Rights (creation of safe spaces, life skills trainings, etc.); (2) Economic opportunity (savings communities, agro-enterprise, irrigation groups, petty trade, etc.); (3) Social opportunity (school clubs, interventions to combat harmful traditional practices); (4) Education (scholarships, school materials, occupational training, library access, etc.) and (5) Health and Security (sanitation and personal hygiene, latrines at home and school (especially for girls), fuel-saving stoves, etc.). According to an evaluation of the program (Catholic Relief Services and the Nike Foundation 2009), school enrollment increased and dropouts decreased; percentage of girls owning small ruminants increased; the percentage of girls using fuel-efficient stoves increased; protein consumption and Vitamin A intake increased; and the number of girls who understood national laws about who a girl can marry increased. This last finding is significant, given that Ethiopia has passed reforms related to the Family Code that significantly strengthen women's rights within marriage (to be discussed below). The number of hours of domestic work girls did per day also decreased.[20]

POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO SECURE GIRLS' CONTROL OF ASSETS

The review thus far has focused on programs and interventions targeted to girls, their families, or both. An untapped opportunity for influence is the sphere of legal policy reform: the reform of procedures, laws, and institutions to encourage secure and equitable asset accumulation by girls. Three types of legal/procedural reforms fall into this category: (1) reforms in laws or procedures to strengthen girls' property rights, including lowering the legal age at which they can own assets (including savings accounts); (2) reforms of inheritance law, to grant girls equal inheritance rights as boys; and (3) reform of marriage and family law, to protect the assets of wives upon marital dissolution, whether through death or divorce. There are relatively few studies or impact evaluations on this topic, but existing findings suggest that this is a promising area.

Changes in **legal procedures** governing ownership, such as lowering the legal age at which girls (and boys) can legally own assets, can go a long way to encourage girls to acquire assets on their own. Improvements in civil registration systems (such as birth registration) may enable girls to obtain the necessary identification needed to open bank accounts. While improvements in civil registries also benefit boys, these may benefit girls more in societies where girls are undervalued and where births of daughters may be underreported.

Reforms in **inheritance law** can go a long way to enable girls to acquire assets through inheritance.

20 For more information on these findings, see "Catholic Relief Services/Ethiopia. "Mid Term Evaluation Report: Empowering Adolescent Girls, CRS Ethiopia Project, "2008."

In 1994, the Indian states of Maharashtra and Karnataka took the lead in amending the inheritance law applying to Hindus to grant daughters equal shares in inheritance relative to sons. In 2005, the national inheritance legislation was amended to eliminate gender discrimination that had thus far prevailed in all but a few southern states. Using data on three generations of individuals,[21] Deininger, Goyal, and Nagarajan (2010) compare land inherited by males and females in Maharashtra and Karnataka, depending on whether their fathers died before or after the 1994 amendment of the Hindu Succession Act. They find that the amendment of the Act had a significant positive impact on the probability that daughters inherited land, although they did not eliminate inequality in landholdings between males and females. The amendment of the Act also had a significant positive impact on age at marriage of females relative to males, and was associated with an increase in female educational attainment.

Reforms in **family law** not only protect the rights of girls upon marital dissolution through death or divorce, but can also encourage parents to invest more in children, particularly girls. In Ethiopia, the passing of the Revised Family Code in 2000 gave equal rights to spouses during the conclusion, duration, and dissolution of marriage, and required equal division of all assets between the husband and wife upon divorce, although adoption of the law has not been uniform across all the regions within Ethiopia, which has a federal system.[22] Compared to baseline perceptions obtained from rural households in 1997, the perception regarding the division of assets upon divorce in 2009 has shifted toward an equal division between the husband and the wife after the passage of the Revised Family Code (Kumar and Quisumbing 2012). This is relevant to adolescent girls, given the low average age at marriage in Ethiopia and relative fluidity of the marital state. Analysis of data on child schooling shows that girls in households where the women perceive the custody of an asset (land, livestock or the house) would be given to the husband on a divorce, are more likely to fall behind their cohort in terms of the highest grade attained (Kumar and Quisumbing 2012). Another study on the reform of the Family Code in Ethiopia (Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo 2011) found that women's economic opportunities expanded relatively more where the reform had been enacted, that is, women were relatively more likely to work in occupations that require work outside the home, in paid and full-time jobs, and in higher-paid occupations. The expansion of women's economic opportunities creates additional incentives for parents to invest in girls—indicating that reforms in the family law and inheritance rights may have far-reaching effects.

The policy space for strengthening girls' property rights may be larger than initially anticipated, because reforms that strengthen women's property rights in general (for example, changes in family law, or well-designed land registration schemes) may also improve their inheritance rights. For example, Ali et al. (2011) find that the recent Rwanda Land Tenure Regularization (LTR) effort improved land access for legally married women (about 76 percent of married couples) and prompted better recordation of inheritance rights without gender bias. Because the process requires an explicit record of who will inherit the parcel, the process significantly reduces succession-related uncertainty. Clarification and documentation of rights reduced uncertainty over who would inherit land, with substantial benefits for female children who might otherwise have been discriminated against (Ali et al. 2011, p. 14). However, women who were not legally married saw diminished property rights, in accordance with the law, and girls residing in female headed households were less likely to be designated as heirs compared to their counterparts in male-headed households. While the authors acknowledge that this finding deserves further exploration, they also point to other data from Mexico (Deere and León 2003) that shows women exhibit strong and persistent preferences for male heirs.

21 The data comes from the nationally representative Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) administered over 2006–2009.

22 Federal Negarit Gazetta Extra Ordinary Issue No. 1/2000 The Revised Family Code Proclamation No. 213/2000.

VI. CRITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND WAY FORWARD

ASSESSING THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

HALF-EMPTY OR HALF-FULL?

All in all we reviewed 38 programs/interventions/policy reforms, out of which we could identify 30 evaluations (both completed and ongoing), based on the materials and documentation that were available to us. While one might think that 80 percent is a good evaluation-to-program ratio, these "evaluations" were of varying rigor and quality of evidence. We reviewed 6 programs that targeted origin families exclusively, of which there were 7 evaluation studies (2 of which are still ongoing). A number of these programs were not systematically evaluated with prospectively identified treatment and control groups because of the infeasibility of randomization and the speed of implementation: these programs were rolled out by national governments almost simultaneously, preventing the use of duration of exposure to identify impact. Some of these were not able to identify recipients at the household or individual level, leading researchers to use eligibility criteria as a way to identify program impact. While, to our knowledge, the econometric techniques used were appropriate to the issues being analyzed, they still relied on assumptions that could only be validated using robustness checks.

We reviewed a greater number of programs targeting adolescents that relied on impact evaluation techniques. Out of 24 programs reviewed, 14 evaluations were conducted, out of which 7 used randomization, 3 used matching methods or quasi-experimental designs, and 4 used qualitative methods. We also reviewed 6 programs targeting both families and adolescents, of which 2 used qualitative methods of evaluation, 2 used quasi-experimental methods, and 1 used an RCT. We only included 2 studies of policy reforms, both of which used econometric methods on large household surveys. While we applaud the use of rigorous impact evaluation methods in a reasonable number of these studies, one can question whether the findings from these evaluations can be generalized, given that they were undertaken in very specific contexts.

EVALUATING BUNDLED INTERVENTIONS

Despite the prevalence of bundled interventions to build adolescent girls' assets, many evaluation studies do not use appropriate counterfactuals. Only one ongoing study attempts to look at impacts of individual program components, using RCTs (Kishoree Kontha in Bangladesh). Yet there is an ethical conflict for many implementing organizations that believe interventions should be bundled. Can one ethically randomize, if you believe that it is the bundled intervention that works? In practice, randomization can be implemented by exploiting the roll-out strategy, but it requires close collaboration between the implementing agency and the evaluation partner. Alternatively, a mixed methods approach might be better able to tease out some lines of association/causality, by asking beneficiaries which aspects of the intervention mattered most to them.

SHORT-TERM VS. LONG-TERM IMPACTS

One of the major weaknesses of the studies reviewed is the short time frame between implementation and evaluation. Unlike income transfers, where one expects to observe immediate, short-term impacts on consumption, the gains of asset ownership only accrue over the long term. The full impact of reforms of inheritance law or of incentive programs to delay marriage cannot be felt within a few years. However, many of these interventions have been evaluated within three to five years after implementation, often because of project implementation cycles. Such short-term measures of program impacts may be misleading. The timing of the evaluation is particularly important for programs that require changes in the behavior of both service providers and service users; if one evaluates too early, one risks finding only partial or no impact; if one waits too long, one risks losing donor and public support for the program or a scaling up of a badly-designed program (King and Behrman 2009). For programs where one expects long-term effects on marriage age, number of children ever born, and lifetime income, among others, a short-term view may lead to the underestimation of the benefits of investing in girls. Undertaking such analyses requires investment in longitudinal data collection to capture the medium- and long-term impacts of interventions, with their accompanying challenges. One of these challenges is making sure that the same individuals and households are tracked over time—which may be more difficult for girls in societies where girls leave their homes or villages upon marriage. Evaluators may not always have the funding to follow up both control and treatment groups (with a sufficiently large sample size to ensure statistical power) over time. In the case of policy reforms or interventions affecting a large portion of the population, one can be opportunistic in using existing data by linking the timing of program implementation to age cohorts in national surveys.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COMPARISONS

One difficulty in identifying promising programs for adolescent girls lies in the fact that not all programs are age-targeted, and evaluations of these programs rarely report their results for different age groups. Given the growing consensus that programs will need to address the age-specific concerns of adolescent girls, there needs to be better reporting of data for different age groups, as well as more age-segmented analyses. This would lead to better **vertical** comparisons between younger and older girls, and also between adolescent girls and women. Indeed, an interesting area for research would be to follow up girls who had been in programs during adolescence, and find out whether these programs had any long-term impacts through adulthood.

At the same time, studies of the impact of programs on adolescent girls must not lose sight of an important comparison group: adolescent boys. A few of the interventions considered were targeted to both adolescent boys and girls and thus allowed for comparison, such as the Siyakha Nentsha program in South Africa, and the programs for AIDS orphans in Uganda evaluated by Ssewamala et al (2009). The evaluations found different impacts by gender – a potentially interesting finding for policymakers that deserves further research. By focusing only on programs targeting adolescent girls, it is possible to neglect other programs that are more broadly targeted to youth. Programs targeting girls do not occur in a vacuum, and should be consistent with other youth-oriented programming in developing countries, even as they take into account girls' specific needs. It is also possible that parents may distribute resources away from girls to other household members (including, but not exclusively boys), counteracting the effect of girl-targeted programming. **Horizontal** comparisons are therefore important.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS

Most programs reviewed report absolute impacts of the program, but not their cost effectiveness. Cost effectiveness does not only include the cost of the transfer received by the beneficiary, but also the administrative costs of operating the transfer program or incentive scheme. Among the studies reviewed, only 2 included a cost-effectiveness analysis. Assessing the cost-effectiveness of these programs remains challenging because inputs and outcomes are often bundled; and most evaluations were not set up to "unbundle" intervention components. This makes it impossible to see what each component of the intervention costs. Moreover, many programs do not systematically collect cost data, and cost-effectiveness analyses based on pilot projects may not have information on the administrative and other costs that may increase once a program is scaled up. This is a missed opportunity, particularly because political leaders may be more easily convinced by economic arguments showing (for example) the monetary benefits to investing in girls, or the monetary advantage of one type of intervention over another.

A LIMITED PORTFOLIO OF POLICY OPTIONS

The existing literature on investments in adolescent girls' assets has also been mostly project or intervention focused. As suggested above, there may be scope for supportive policy or legislative reform to create an environment for investing in girls. Thus, it is possible that we are not considering the entire range of investment options. We turn to this below.

CREATING A SUPPORTIVE ENVIRONMENT AT THE COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LEVEL

Interventions that challenge social norms and deep-seated beliefs about girls' owning and controlling assets do not occur in a vacuum. Projects and programs need to explicitly consider the need to change the structures within which these programs operate. In some cases, the programs were not as effective as they could have been because community members were unwilling to accept the changes (for example, girls wanted to work but people wouldn't hire them, or girls wanted to open savings accounts at the post office but were intimidated by staff who didn't think having an account was proper for girls). While program staff may attempt to change the mindset of girls, unsupportive communities will undermine these changes. Some programs have made efforts to involve and consult the community in implementing these programs, but more clearly needs to be done by explicitly recognizing communities as targets for interventions.

Policy reform that removes gender discrimination can provide the supportive environment underlying this entire process. The strengthening of democratic institutions via legislation, the rewriting of constitutions so that they explicitly disavow discrimination, and the reform and enforcement of an anti-discriminatory rule of law are important steps. While such reforms do not automatically translate into changes on the ground, they provide an important signal of the government's commitment, to which women can appeal for stronger rights—and which demonstrates what girls can aspire to once they are adults. Such laws must also eliminate gender discrimination in ownership of and access to economically productive assets. Customary laws in many countries treat women as minors, thereby restricting their rights to such assets and opportunities. However, gender-based legal reform cannot be instituted without sensitivity to tradition. Customs do not change overnight, especially in countries with ancient cultures. Education and social marketing can play a role, but until majority values change, successful legal reform will have to build on positive traditional values.

CREATING A MINDSET THAT SUPPORTS LEARNING AND INNOVATION BY PRACTITIONERS

In contrast to programs that aim to increase girls' human capital, programs that aim to increase girls' ability to invest in and control physical and financial assets are fairly new. Thus, it is no surprise that the evidence base for measuring impact is relatively small. Yet, many civil society organizations are undertaking programs to build girls' assets, though often with limited documentation. Programs are modified in an ad hoc manner, without systematic evaluation. Without evaluation, it is difficult to recommend what programs can be scaled up. Likewise, it is difficult to know what design features can be modified for local conditions without adversely affecting the overall outcome of the intervention (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2010).

This does not mean that experimentation should be discouraged, nor that implementers need to wait for the results of rigorous impact evaluations before implementing new programs. Because gender norms are context specific, adaptation to local conditions is essential. These adaptations provide possibilities for impact evaluation that will, in turn, inform the next generation of projects. However, opportunities, constraints, and entry points for intervention differ considerably across developing countries, and even within specific countries there may be substantial heterogeneity in gender roles and women's and girls' property rights. For program designers and policymakers to better design and implement programs to increase girls' ownership and control of assets, documentation of local adaptations, as well as what worked and what didn't work, will be essential. Innovations in delivery systems and mechanism design can be explicitly tested, and research and implementation can inform each other for mutual learning. Instead of impact evaluation being undertaken by an outside entity that may not be fully aware of implementation processes, external evaluators can be brought in from the start to work with implementers, so that a sound evaluation design can be part of project implementation and roll-out. An institutional mindset that supports openness, innovation, and learning will be essential for the future growth and development of these efforts.

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ANNEX 1
MAPPING OF RELEVANT RESEARCH AND EVALUATIONS OF INTERVENTIONS

IN A SEPARATE EXCEL DOCUMENT. FIND IT ONLINE AT GIRLEFFECT.ORG.

ANNEX 2
QUANTITATIVE DATA ON ADOLESCENT GIRLS

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

TABLE 1 AVERAGE WEEKLY WORKING HOURS FOR GIRLS, AGES 12-14

REGION/COUNTRY	AVERAGE HOURS WORKED (PER WEEK)
AFRICA	
Cameroon	19.4
Mali	34.9
ASIA	
Bangladesh	19.8
Cambodia	23.8
Phillippines	13.1
LATIN AMERICA	
Guatemala	40.2
Peru	14.5

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)

TABLE 2 PROPORTION OF WORKING GIRLS, AGE 5-14 THAT ARE UNPAID FAMILY WORKERS

REGION/COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE OF GIRLS
AFRICA	
Ghana	90.4
Kenya	84.2
ASIA	
Bangladesh	80.7
Cambodia	90.8
Philippines	75.4
LATIN AMERICA	
Honduras	75.1
Colombia	55.9

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)

TABLE 3 PROPORTION OF EMPLOYED GIRLS, AGES 15-19, WHO EARN CASH IN THEIR EMPLOYMENT

REGION/COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE OF GIRLS
AFRICA	
Cameroon	57.3
Mali	68.7
ASIA	
Bangladesh	93.4
Cambodia	43.3
Philippines	93.5
LATIN AMERICA	
Guatemala	86.7
Peru	68.1

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)

SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INDICATORS

TABLE 4 PROPORTION OF WOMEN FIRST MARRIED BY AGE 15, 18, 20

REGION/COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE (AGES 20-24) MARRIED BY AGE 15	PERCENTAGE MARRIED BY AGE 18	PERCENTAGE MARRIED BY AGE 20
AFRICA			
Cameroon	16.5	47.2	64.1
Mali	24.6	70.6	85.5
ASIA			
Bangladesh	32.3	66.2	79.2
Cambodia	2.5	23.3	42.4
Philippines	2.1	14.2	30.7
LATIN AMERICA			
Bolivia	3.2	21.7	35.8
Honduras	10.8	38.8	54.4

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)

TABLE 5 AGE AT FIRST BIRTH

REGION/COUNTRY	FIRST BIRTH BY AGE 15 (% OF WOMEN AGES 15-19)	MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST BIRTH (YEARS)
AFRICA		
Cameroon	3.2	19
Mali	5.3	18
ASIA		
Bangladesh	5.0	19
Cambodia	0.2	Not available
Philippines	0.2	Not available
LATIN AMERICA		
Colombia	1.7	Not available
Honduras	1.5	Not available

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)

TABLE 6 AGE AT FIRST SEXUAL ENCOUNTER

REGION/COUNTRY	SEX BY AGE 15 (% OF WOMEN)	SEX BY AGE 18 (% OF WOMEN)	MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST SEXUAL ENCOUNTER (YEARS)
AFRICA			
Cameroon	18	68.2	18
Mali	23.5	73	18
ASIA			
Bangladesh	Not available	Not available	Not available
Cambodia	0.7	19	Not available
Philippines	2.1	17.1	Not available
LATIN AMERICA			
Colombia	13.7	53.6	Not available
Honduras	9.8	45.4	Not available

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)

HEALTH INDICATORS

TABLE 7 PROPORTION OF GIRLS, AGED 15-19, WHO SAY THAT THEY HAVE THE FINAL SAY IN DECISIONS ON THEIR OWN HEALTH

COUNTRY	PROPORTION OF WOMEN (%)
AFRICA	
Cameroon	8.9
Mali	9.9
ASIA	
Bangladesh	37.0
Philippines	67.0
LATIN AMERICA	
Bolivia	50.9
Peru	44.3

Data taken from: Girls Discovered Global Maps (http://www.girlsdiscovered.org/)